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The  cu r ren t
i n t e r n a t i o n a l
f inancia l  cr is is  in
the  subpr ime
segment  in  the
Un i te s  S ta te s ,
wh ich  begun  in  Augus t  2007 ,
became worse in September 2008.
The bankruptcy of the fourth largest
North-American investment bank –
Lehman Brothers – is considered the
main cause of this process. In this
case ,  the  Nor th -Amer i can
gove rnment  adopted  d i f fe ren t
behavior in comparison with the
Bear Stearns’1 bankruptcy in March
2008. Surprisingly, the government
did not project a rescue operation,
and ,  consequent l y ,  the  Lehman
Brothers entered into concordata.
The consequence of these options
was extremely serious. In fact, there
was a considerable deterioration in
investors’ expectations on a global
scale, which may cause, in such a
way, moments of generalized panic
in  the  marke t s .  Banks  and
companies, including those in good
f inanc ia l  cond i t ion ,  began  to
encounter several problems raising
funds and short-term credit l ines.
Bes ides  th i s ,  the  conce rns  and
The downturn
has taken its
toll on the real
economy of
d e v e l o p e d
countries
1 In March 2008, the FED extended a US$ 30bn credit line to
JP Morgan Chase for Bear Sterns’ purchase.
billion by the beginning of December
(Graph 4).
Conclusions
The worsening of the international
financial crisis from September 2008
is a result of the Lehman Brothers’
bankruptcy, which was, until then,
the fourth largest North-American
investment bank. The bankruptcy of
the inst i tut ion af fected investor
expec ta t ions  on  a  g loba l  s ca le ,
increasing the uncertainty in relation
to the financial health of the entire
banking system. The decision made




o f  one  o f
the  ma in
p laye r s  in
the credit markets and global capi-
tal, constituted a serious mistake in
economic  po l i c y .  The  l ack  o f
conf idence  tha t  fe l l  upon  the
marke t s  r e su l ted  not  on l y  in
considerable losses for  the main
stock exchanges in the world, but
also raised the costs of short-term
and  midd le - te rm loans  in  the
interbanking markets.
7 According to the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER), which determines the duration of the expansion and
contraction cycles of the North-American economy, the recession
began in December 2007. In this definition, a set of economic
indicators are included, such as monthly data on industrial
production, income and unemployment.
Pe rhaps  the  Nor th -Amer i can
government has learned something
f rom such  mi s takes .  The  b road
expansion of the system’s liquidity
by the authorities may improve the
concession of loans between the
banks l itt le by l itt le. The spreads
be tween  the  L ibo r  ra te  o f  the
interbanking market and the yields
of the U.S.  Treasury bonds have
fa l len  over  the  las t  few weeks ,
leading to the levels seen previous
to the Lehman Brothers’ case.
Therefore, it is sti l l  too early to
affirm that the worst period is over.
The most recent data on the activity
level in the 3Q2008 presented the
first impacts
of the global
c r e d i t
crunch on
t h e
e c o n o m y .
The US and the UK, for instance,
presented negative growth rates in
GDP, of 0.5%, in comparison with
the immediate previous quarter.7 On
the other hand, the Euro Zone and
Japan are a l ready in recess ion,
accumulat ing two consecut ive
quarters of setback to economic
act iv i ty .  The f inanc ia l  cr i s i s ,
therefore, has hit the real economy.
The question is to know for how long
the process will continue and how
deep it will be.
Lehman’s bankruptcy was a
mistake, but the US government
seems to have learned the lesson
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distrust in relation to the solvency
of  the  Nor th -Amer i can  bank ing
sy s tem,  a s  we l l  a s  i t s  r eces s i ve
impac t s  on  the  economy,  a l so
increased. Therefore, the Lehman
Brothers’ bankruptcy is effectively a
discerning point in the worsening of
the financial crisis.
The US government decided to re-
sume interventions in the private
markets due to the impact of the
Lehman Brothers ’  bankruptcy.  In
cooperation with the main European
economies, the Federal Reserve (FED)
– the US Central Bank – and the US
Treasury held massive liquidity and
capital injections into the financial
system. These measures ,  despi te
including a wide array of sources,
were  not  ab le  to  immed ia te l y
It is worth noting that, since the
beginning of the financial crisis, the
expans ion of  l iqu id i ty  in  the US
economy was made possible by the
monetary authority in two different
ways. At first, the FED maintained
a  cons tan t  to ta l  amount  o f  i t s
assets and reduced the portion of
public bonds in its portfolio, which
were exchanged for private credits
with lower liquidity that were in the
banks portfolios.2 After September
2008, the North-American Central
Bank not only reduced the amount
of public bonds in its portfolio, but
a l so  l a rge l y  inc reased  the  to ta l
amount of credits  to the pr ivate
sec to r  by  means
of  seve ra l
i n s t ruments  –
r e p u r c h a s e
agreements  and
te rm auc t ion
credits, among others.
The increase of  the FED’s  tota l
assets from September 2008 is a
resu l t  f rom the worsening of  the
financial crisis, as well as from the
d i f fe ren t  behav io r  o f  the  Nor th -
American authorit ies in relation to
the Lehman Brothers’ case. Several
fol lowing cases may i l lustrate this
process. To wit: i) the US$ 85 billion
rescue operation for AIG3 – the US’
largest insurance company -, just a
day after the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers; ii) approval of the US$ 700
billion rescue plan by the US Treasury
to  purchase of  i l l iqu id  ( t roubled)
assets from financial institutions –
TARP  (T roub led  Asse t  Re l i e f
Program)4; iii) the creation of a credit
line for the purchase of commercial
papers from North-
A m e r i c a n
companies in order




The  unce r ta in t y  re l a ted  to  the
financial health of the main US banks
was so serious that the U.S. Treasury
decided to use part of the US$ 700
billion approved for the purchase of
preemptive stocks from the financial
i n s t i tu t ions ,  i nc lud ing  in su rance
company AIG.6 Indeed, it is related
not  on l y  to  the  gove rnment ’s
extensive investment in the capital of
such  in s t i tu t ions ,  bu t  a l so
cor re sponds  to  a  pa r t i a l
nationalization, temporary or not, of
the North-American financial system.
Also,  ten of  the la rgest  f inanc ia l
inst i tut ions had received US$ 185
Graph 1: Main World Stock Exchange Indexes since 
the Beginning of the Crisis 
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FTSE 100: - 35.5%
Dax Index: - 41.7%
Nikkei 225: - 50.6%
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FED’s assets increased from
US$ 940 bn to US$ 2,12 trn
between Aug and Nov 2008
2 Refer to Torres Filho and Borça Jr. (2008) – Brazilian Economic
Insights No. 50.
3 At the beginning of November, support to AIG was modified,
reaching a total volume of US$ 152.5 billion.
4 In mid-November, there was a change to the original
package, which was no longer earmarked for the purchase of
illiquid assets, but rather for the capitalization of banks aimed
at opening access to credit for consumers.
5 On October 21st, the FED created a credit line for the
money market funds, named the ‘Money Market Investor
Funding Facility’ (MMIFF), aiming at providing the support
needed so that the private sector may provide liquidity to
investors in the North-American market.
6 Indeed, the North-American authorities followed the steps
previously decided by the United Kingdom and some countries
in the Euro Zone.
Tabela 4- Geração Líq. de Empregos por Região e Participação de cada Região no
                                    no Saldo Líquido Total
36
res to re  the  n rma l  ope ra t ing
conditions of the credit and capital
markets,  especial ly in relat ion to
operations in interbanking markets.
In  th is  sense,  th is  s tudy a ims at
providing an overview of the latest
events related to the international
f inanc ia l  c r i s i s  and  a l so  a t
p roceed ing  w i th  the  ana l y s i s
presented in  Braz i l i an  Economic
Insights Nº. 44 and Nº. 50.
Increase in uncertainty and its
impacts on the stock markets
The bankruptcy of  the Lehman
Brothers, as previously mentioned,
worsened the current international
f inanc ia l  cr i s i s .
The deterioration
of expectat ions
was so ser ious
that  the most
important stock markets in the whole
world, after this event, presented
severe fluctuations in their respective
prices. Graph 1 clearly displays this
process with the evolution of the
main stock exchange indexes of the
US, Europe and Japan since August
2007, which was the main cause of
the financial crisis.
The North-American indexes – Dow
Jones ,  S&P  500  and  Nasdaq  –
presented losses close to or higher
than  40% up  to  the  end  o f
November .  The  Eu ropean  s tock
exchanges  d id  not  p re sent  a
different s i tuat ion. Both the Dax
Index, in Frankfurt, and the FTSE
100,  in  London,  incur red losses
h igher  than 35%. But  the  most
dramatic case is the Japanese Nikkei
225 index  of  the  Tokyo Stock
Exchange, which has suffered a loss
of over 50% since the beginning of
the financial crisis. The estimated
losses reach some disturbing values.
According to Bloomberg calculations,
corporations registered worldwide
losses higher than US$ 32 trillion in
market value from the end of 2007
until November 2008.
The effects on interbanking
markets
The impacts resulting from the US
g o v e r n m e n t ’s
dec i s ion  to
a l low the
bankruptcy  o f
the  Lehman
Brothers can also be perceived in the
in te rbank ing  marke t s .  Graph  2
present s  the  sp read  behav io r
between: i) the Libor interest rate
o f  the  in te rbank ing  marke t ,  i n
London, concerning the deposits in
US dollars for loans with a term of
one month (Libor 1M USD) and six
months (Libor 6M USD); and ii) the
public bonds of the North-American
government with similar maturity
(USG 1M) and (USG 6M).
Libor is the most internationally
used  ra te  a s  a  shor t - te rm
benchmark  in  the  in te rbank ing
marke t s ,  where  banks  take  out
loans with each other with varying
broadened the economy’s liquidity.
This process may be noted in the data
in Graph 3.  There was a st rong
increase in the value of the total
assets of the North-American Central
Bank,  f rom US$ 940 bi l l ion to
US$ 2.15 trillion between August and
November 2008 – an increase of more
than 100%. Furthermore, a significant
change occurred in its composition
since the beginning of 2007.
In the beginning of the financial
c r i s i s ,  in  August  2007,  the  U.S .
Treasury bonds represented 87% of
the Federal Reserve’s total assets,
fo r  i n s tance ,  rough l y  US$  785
billion. On the other hand, credits
to the private sector totaled only
US$ 26 billion, or 3% of the total
assets.  According to this data in
the  end  o f  November  2008 ,  a
considerable inversion may be noted
in this scenario. The credits to the
pr i va te  sec to r  r eached  US$  1 .1
trillion, more than 50% of the total
assets. The US Treasury bonds fell
to US$ 476 bi l l ion,  represent ing
roughly 22% of the total assets.
Graph 4: Capital Investment of FED by means of the Purchase of 
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US stock exchanges feature
losses higher than 40% since
the beginning of the crisis
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terms,  f rom overn ight  up to  12
months, and which do not require
any collateral.  In addition to this,
i t  i s  a  pe rcept ion  ind i ca to r  o f
ex i s t ing  r i sk s  in  the  s cope  o f
opera t ions  be tween  banks .  The
y ie ld s  o f  the  US  pub l i c  bonds
represent  a  spread rate  with no
market risks. The spread between
these rates represents the private
banking sector risks in relation to
the public sector.
I t  i s  worth not ing that  s t rong
uncertainties concerning the financial
health of the banks have materialized
since the Lehman Brothers’ episode,
and in relation to the easing of the
North-American monetary policy as
well as other steps implemented for
the injection into liquidity. This swiftly
and abruptly raised the costs of the
short-term and middle-term loans –
30 or  180 days – with in the
interbanking markets .  The r i sk
perception of banks increased in
relation to the loans between each
other, causing the monthly spreads
on government bonds, for instance,
to reach a threshold of 4.5% per year
on October 10th – a rate that virtually
stopped these operations between
the banks.
The return to operat ions in the
in te rbank ing  marke t s  cou ld  be
noted over the last few weeks, but
conditions are not normal. Despite
the  month ly  spreads  decreas ing
from 3.0% to 1.5% per year within
15 days – from the last week of
Oc tober  un t i l  the  f i r s t  week  o f
November 2008 -, indicating that
the steps concerning the injection
into liquidity may provide positive
effects, the risk perception of the
banking system is sti l l  significant.
Indeed, the rates are higher than
the thresholds presented before the
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. The
same analysis is val id for the six-
month operations.
The reaction of the US Treasury
andthe Federal Reserve
The FED decided to act due to the
deterioration of expectations and
the uncertainty on the markets after
the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy.
The North-Amer ican monetary
author i ty  swif t ly  and extens ive ly
Graph 2: Evolution of Interbanking Rates in Relation to the Public Bonds 
Spread with Similar Terms - In % per Year  
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Graph 3: Composition of FED Total Assets 
USD Trillion – Data until November 2008 
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increased. Therefore, the Lehman
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discerning point in the worsening of
the financial crisis.
The US government decided to re-
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Lehman Brothers ’  bankruptcy.  In
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economies, the Federal Reserve (FED)
– the US Central Bank – and the US
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capital injections into the financial
system. These measures ,  despi te
including a wide array of sources,
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It is worth noting that, since the
beginning of the financial crisis, the
expans ion of  l iqu id i ty  in  the US
economy was made possible by the
monetary authority in two different
ways. At first, the FED maintained
a  cons tan t  to ta l  amount  o f  i t s
assets and reduced the portion of
public bonds in its portfolio, which
were exchanged for private credits
with lower liquidity that were in the
banks portfolios.2 After September
2008, the North-American Central
Bank not only reduced the amount
of public bonds in its portfolio, but
a l so  l a rge l y  inc reased  the  to ta l
amount of credits  to the pr ivate
sec to r  by  means
of  seve ra l
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te rm auc t ion
credits, among others.
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financial crisis, as well as from the
d i f fe ren t  behav io r  o f  the  Nor th -
American authorit ies in relation to
the Lehman Brothers’ case. Several
fol lowing cases may i l lustrate this
process. To wit: i) the US$ 85 billion
rescue operation for AIG3 – the US’
largest insurance company -, just a
day after the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers; ii) approval of the US$ 700
billion rescue plan by the US Treasury
to  purchase of  i l l iqu id  ( t roubled)
assets from financial institutions –
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Program)4; iii) the creation of a credit
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financial health of the main US banks
was so serious that the U.S. Treasury
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billion approved for the purchase of
preemptive stocks from the financial
i n s t i tu t ions ,  i nc lud ing  in su rance
company AIG.6 Indeed, it is related
not  on l y  to  the  gove rnment ’s
extensive investment in the capital of
such  in s t i tu t ions ,  bu t  a l so
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FED’s assets increased from
US$ 940 bn to US$ 2,12 trn
between Aug and Nov 2008
2 Refer to Torres Filho and Borça Jr. (2008) – Brazilian Economic
Insights No. 50.
3 At the beginning of November, support to AIG was modified,
reaching a total volume of US$ 152.5 billion.
4 In mid-November, there was a change to the original
package, which was no longer earmarked for the purchase of
illiquid assets, but rather for the capitalization of banks aimed
at opening access to credit for consumers.
5 On October 21st, the FED created a credit line for the
money market funds, named the ‘Money Market Investor
Funding Facility’ (MMIFF), aiming at providing the support
needed so that the private sector may provide liquidity to
investors in the North-American market.
6 Indeed, the North-American authorities followed the steps
previously decided by the United Kingdom and some countries
in the Euro Zone.
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financial crisis from September 2008
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o f  one  o f
the  ma in
p laye r s  in
the credit markets and global capi-
tal, constituted a serious mistake in
economic  po l i c y .  The  l ack  o f
conf idence  tha t  fe l l  upon  the
marke t s  re su l ted  not  on l y  in
considerable losses for  the main
stock exchanges in the world, but
also raised the costs of short-term
and  midd le - te rm loans  in  the
interbanking markets.
7 According to the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER), which determines the duration of the expansion and
contraction cycles of the North-American economy, the recession
began in December 2007. In this definition, a set of economic
indicators are included, such as monthly data on industrial
production, income and unemployment.
Pe rhaps  the  Nor th -Amer i can
government has learned something
f rom such  mi s takes .  The  b road
expansion of the system’s liquidity
by the authorities may improve the
concession of loans between the
banks l itt le by l itt le. The spreads
be tween  the  L ibo r  ra te  o f  the
interbanking market and the yields
of the U.S.  Treasury bonds have
fa l len  over  the  las t  few weeks ,
leading to the levels seen previous
to the Lehman Brothers’ case.
Therefore, it is sti l l  too early to
affirm that the worst period is over.
The most recent data on the activity
level in the 3Q2008 presented the
first impacts
of the global
c r e d i t
crunch on
t h e
e c o n o m y .
The US and the UK, for instance,
presented negative growth rates in
GDP, of 0.5%, in comparison with
the immediate previous quarter.7 On
the other hand, the Euro Zone and
Japan are a l ready in recess ion,
accumulat ing two consecut ive
quarters of setback to economic
act iv i ty .  The f inanc ia l  cr i s i s ,
therefore, has hit the real economy.
The question is to know for how long
the process will continue and how
deep it will be.
Lehman’s bankruptcy was a
mistake, but the US government
seems to have learned the lesson
